Why This Time is Different: The North Korea Crisis and New Zealand’s Interests

Author: Steff, R.
Published in National Security Journal, 09 April 2020

26 US Department of State, “Agreed Framework.” Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm. For a fuller account of Carter’s intervention see Marion V. Creekmore, A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).

27 Sheryl Wudunn, “North Korea Fires Missile Over Japanese Territory,” New York Times, 1 September 1998; “An Intelligence Fiasco,” The Chosunilbo, 6 September 1998. Available at: http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/1998/09/06/1998090661255.html

28 Nicholas Khoo and Reuben Steff, Security at a Price : The International Politics of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017) .

29 “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address,” The Washington Post, 29 January 2002. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm?nore- direct=on. For more on pre-emption see Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science Quarterly, 118(3) (2003), pp. 365-388.

30 Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review, 56(3) (Summer 2003), p. 11.

31 Pollack, No Exit, 145.

32 32 Ibid, 149.

33 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695, 15 July 2006. Available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8778.doc.htm

34 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, 14 October 2006. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8778.doc.htm

35 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks with Croatian Foreign Minister Gordan Jandrokovic after Their Meeting,” US Department of State, 10 December 2009, Washington D.C. Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/12/133416.htm

36 “N Korea defends nuclear test citing fate of Saddam, Gaddafi,” Asia Times. Available at: https://www.asiatimes.com/2016/01/article/n-korea-defends-nuclear-test-citing-fate-of-saddam-gaddafi/

37 “North Korean Missile Launches & Nuclear Tests: 1984-Present,” Missilethreat.com, 29 November 2017. Available at: https://missilethreat.csis.org/north-korea-missile-launches-1984-present/

38 Cary Huang, “President Xi Jinping issues call for regional stability,” South China Morning Post, 7 April 2013. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1209104/president-xi-jinping-issues-call-regional-stability

39 Jane Perlez, “China Ban on Items for Nuclear Use to North Korea May Stall Arms Bid,” New York Times, 29 September, 2013.

40 “Leaked U.S. Cable Indicates North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il Does Not Trust China,” Taipei Times, 6 September 2011. Available at: http://taipeitimes.com/news/world/ archives/2011/09/06/2003512607

41 “Wikileaks cables: China ‘frustrated’ by North Korea,” BBC, 30 November 2010. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-11871641

42 Barry Rubin explained that labelling a state a ‘rogue’ was akin to giving them “a certificate of political insanity.” Barry Rubin, “US Foreign Policy and Rogue States,” Middle East Review of International Studies, 3(3) (September 1999), pp. 49–57. In 2016 as a presidential candidate Donald J. Trump stated “If you look at North Korea, this guy, I mean, he’s like a maniac…” Quoted in Somini Sengupta and Jane Perlez, “U.N. Stiffens Sanctions on North Korea, Trying to Slow its Nuclear March,” New York Times, 30 November, 2016; Nikki Haley, US Ambassador to the UN, stated in reference to Kim Jung-Un, “We are not dealing with a rational person.” Liu Chen, “Seeking To Ease Tensions, China Proposes Trade-Off,” South China Morning Post, 9 March, 2017. It appears that since Trump and Kim met in June 2018, no senior US officials have suggested Kim is irrational.

43 Campbell Craig claims that this would bring the unipolar system into a state of ‘disequilibrium’. See Campbell Craig, “American Power Preponderance and the Nuclear Revolution,” Review of International Studies, 35(1) (January, 2009), pp. 27-44.

44 The American strategist Thomas Schelling is often attributed with formalising the idea that acting as though one were irrational – including by increasing the risk of nuclear conflict – can be a rational course of action for states seeking to gain leverage. See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).