The Other Side of the Hill – Endeavouring to Define Intelligence in the 21st Century: A Perspective

Author: Battersby, John1

Published in National Security Journal, 25 September 2024

DOI: 10.36878/nsj20240925.01 

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Abstract

This paper discusses not a definition but defining characteristics of intelligence, those it has inherited from the Cold War, and those which new conditions are forcing it to adapt to. Intelligence cannot be reduced to a simple sentence-length definition. Intelligence is iterative – its nature varies depending on the context in which it is produced. Its unconventional methods combined with its exclusivity of method and content makes intelligence information different from other sorts. These essential characteristics allow us to understand the relationship between different intelligence’s and between them and related concepts of ‘intelligence-adjacency’ as well as good old fashioned, but ever reliable, basic ‘research’. Intelligence has a wide ambit; it is not a discipline in itself, but something combining varying methods of information gathering and analysis to create ephemeral knowledge of genuine, but ephemeral, value – within the varying contexts in which it is used.

Keywords: Intelligence, Intelligence-adjacency, Open-source intelligence, Decision-making, Research.


Introduction

All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don’t know from what you do; that’s what I call ‘guessing what was on the other side of the hill’.1

Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington

The impetus for this paper comes from several years teaching ‘intelligence professionals’ some of whom are (or previously were) in traditional intelligence agencies but include many more from other intelligence-active agencies, where intelligence is not the latter’s core function. A number are military, a pursuit in which intelligence has a much more ingrained and understood role in attaining operational objectives. Many are from law enforcement or regulatory agencies, most obviously NZ Police – for which the difference between collecting data, collecting intelligence and collecting evidence can be something of a greyscale. Finally, there is a seasoning of younger students intellectually interested, curious about, or critical of, intelligence agencies and their role in the state – or, just as often, wanting to join them. Overall, they reflect a membership of a morphed and morphing intelligence environment in New Zealand, and elsewhere, in the 21st century.

Working with this grouping, it has become increasingly apparent firstly that collective memory of the Cold War is rapidly fading – many current practitioners of intelligence did not experience it, nor have any recollection of the peculiar all-embracing security orientation of intelligence agencies during it. The intelligence game of the shadows, of covert agents and their handlers, of monopolies of secret and stolen information, is something many know only by movie and television depictions of that time. Professor Christopher Andrew notes the historical amnesia of 21st century intelligence agencies,2 and former US Assistant Director of Central Intelligence Mark Lowenthal observes the lack of lessons learned by intelligence practitioners from recent experience due to the constant press of new demands.3 Intelligence is indeed ephemeral; but intelligence has a history, and history is classroom.

Secondly, the rapid expansion of information technology has, as historian Calder Walton notes, inverted the nature of intelligence from primarily covert-collection-dominant, to a world in which almost everything is in the open.4 So much so, in fact, that the intelligence process has in cases morphed to harvesting massive amounts of information floating in media or cyber space, sieving and threshing it, to isolate the bits and pieces that may be useful for analysis. The ‘google-analyst’ is now a reality, for better or for worse. An irony observed by historian Rhys Ball, is that this open-source intelligence (OSINT) is then converted into closed and secret knowledge – ‘top secret’ stuff derived from everyday fare.5 This is an important element of intelligence now.

Outside of defined security intelligence agencies New Zealand government organisations conducting such analysis are not covered by the Intelligence and Security Act 2017, and their outputs are disclosable under the Official Information Act 1982. This leaves something of a quandary. How can intelligence be intelligence when potentially anyone can know about it?

This paper will therefore discuss the characteristics of intelligence, those it has inherited from the Cold War, and those which new conditions are forcing it to adapt to. It will be argued here that critical elements of intelligence are its unconventional method, and the exclusivity of both method and resulting information; its importance, value and restricted access makes intelligence information different from all other sorts. But intelligence is ephemeral; its value erodes as the need for it does, or as its shroud of secrecy is broken. These essential characteristics allow us to better understand what ‘intelligence’ is, what intelligence professionals do, as well as the relationship between ‘intelligence’ and concepts of ‘intelligence-adjacency’ and good old fashioned, but ever reliable, basic ‘research’.

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1 Dr John Battersby is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University (Wellington Campus).