Author: Hoselton, Liam. P. S.1
Published in National Security Journal, 21 July 2026
Download full PDF version – The (Dis)continuities of counter- terrorism in responses to foreign interference: Evidence from New Zealand and Canada (384 KB)
Abstract
For the last twenty-five years, counter-terrorism has occupied a central role in the organisation of national security governance across many Western liberal democracies. While terrorism has not disappeared, intensifying concerns regarding geostrategic competition and hostile state activity have begun to recalibrate established threat hierarchies and institutional priorities. Foreign interference has emerged as a central organising concern in this evolving security landscape. Despite its distinctive characteristics, available evidence suggests that foreign interference is sometimes addressed using resources, networks, practices, and les-sons developed in counter-terrorism contexts. Drawing on an assemblage-based framework attentive to logics, infrastructures, resources, and practices, this article uses a comparative analysis of New Zealand and Canada to explain how and why elements of counter-terrorism configurations are continued, adapted, or differentiated in emerging responses to foreign interference. It argues that these outcomes reflect contested institutional development rather than natural policy evolution. Primary and secondary data suggest that continuity is most likely where foreign interference has lower epistemic salience, limited dedicated resources, and is absorbed into existing counter-terrorism infrastructures; adaptation where inherited infrastructures prove malleable to reconfiguration and are supported by epistemic salience; and differentiation where foreign interference gains sufficient salience, resources, and institutional support to justify more specialised approaches.
Keywords: Foreign Interference; Counter-Terrorism; Security Studies; Security Assemblages; Institutional Adaptation; Canada; New Zealand.
Introduction
The national security architectures of Western liberal democracies are in a state of flux. For much of the last twenty-five years, counter-terrorism has occupied a central role in the organisation of national security governance. The events of 9/11, the “Global War on Terror”, and subsequent terrorist attacks across the world contributed to the development of an expansive global counter-terrorism apparatus, including the extension of powers, authorities, and capabilities through new and expanded laws, surveillance practices, intelligence and policing functions, interagency coordination mechanisms, and community engagement initiatives.1While the threat of terrorism has not disappeared, intensifying concerns regarding geostrategic competition and hostile state activity have begun to recalibrate established threat hierarchies and institutional priorities.2 Foreign interference has emerged as a central organising concern in this evolving security landscape.3
While foreign interference is an essentially contested term with no universally accept-ed definition, this article proposes a working definition based on the extant academic literature. Here, foreign interference is defined as an array of activities thought to be undertaken or directed by an external actor, often involving a proxy, with the real or perceived intent to harm a target’s interests, values, norms, processes, relationships, institutions, capacities or capabilities.4 Foreign interference is commonly associated with activities such as political interference, information influence operations, economic coercion, transnational repression, lawfare, and state-sponsored violence, among others.5 Although foreign interference is not new, advancements in technology, growing economic interdependence, and increased cross-border mobility have greatly expanded the range of vulnerabilities open to exploitation by adversarial actors, while lowering the costs and risks associated with such conduct.6 Several liberal democracies now warn that they face unprecedented levels of foreign interference, giving the issue renewed urgency.7
Despite its growing prominence, emerging evidence suggests that many of the resources, networks, practices, and lessons developed in counter-terrorism contexts are being redeployed to address foreign interference.8 While government reports and academic literature increasingly acknowledge this redeployment, they rarely question why it is occurring or what its implications are for foreign interference responses. This influence matters because it can shape how foreign interference is understood, which institutions are given authority, where resources are directed, and how the problem is treated in practice. Using primary and secondary data, this article addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of New Zealand and Canada. Applying an assemblage-based lens attentive to logics, infrastructures, resources, and practices, the article examines how and why configurations associated with counter-terrorism are reproduced, adapted, or differentiated in emerging counter-foreign interference responses.
The central argument is that the continuity, adaptation and differentiation of count-er-terrorism approaches in foreign interference responses are best understood as a contested process of institutional development rather than a natural evolution of security policy.9 Continuity occurred where foreign interference had lower public and epistemic salience than terrorism, dedicated resources were limited, and established counter-terrorism infrastructures were expanded to absorb new responsibilities. Adaptation occurred where foreign interference had greater salience and inherited infrastructures were malleable enough to be reoriented. Differentiation occurred where foreign interference achieved high public and epistemic salience, dedicated resourcing was made available, and new infrastructures could be developed and justified. These outcomes did not emerge naturally. They reflected internal deliberations and struggles over which problems matter, where authority should reside, how resources should be allocated, and which practices should endure. These findings matter because they suggest that elements of counter-terrorism configurations may persist, not because they are particularly well suited to addressing the issues of foreign interference, but through processes of resistance, competition, and politicisation.
The article begins by introducing its assemblage-based framework and methodology. Logics, infrastructures, resources and practices are defined in the analysis subsection of the methodology. The article then traces the contemporary emergence of foreign interference as a national security concern in New Zealand and Canada, before examining purposively selected vignettes of continuity, adaptation, and differentiation of counter-terrorism configurations in foreign interference responses. It then brings the two cases together through a comparative synthesis attentive to logics, infrastructures, resources, and practices. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the findings and their implications.
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1 Liam Hoselton is a PhD Candidate in Defence and Security Studies at Massey University. His research examines the effects of national security responses to foreign interference in multicultural liberal democracies. He has contributed a chapter to the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Gray Zone Conflicts and made public submissions on foreign interference legislation in Canada and New Zealand. His research is supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and Massey University. The views expressed here are entirely his own. Correspondence may be addressed through the Managing Editor of the National Security Journal at j.m.battersby@massey.ac.nz.